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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, fifty-two-year-old Terry C. Anderson pleaded guilty to
felony  DUI.   The  district  court  imposed  a  unified  sentence  of  ten  years,  with  six  years  fixed.
Mr. Anderson filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) motion for a reduction of sentence,
which  the  district  court  denied.   On  appeal,  Mr.  Anderson  asserts  the  district  court  abused  its
discretion when it imposed his sentence, when it executed his sentence rather than place him on
probation, and when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
2Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Blackfoot Police Department officers responded to a two-vehicle crash.  (Presentence
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)1  A white truck had rear-ended a tow truck.  (See PSI, p.38.)  At
the  scene,  officers  contacted  Mr.  Anderson,  the  driver  of  the  white  truck.   (PSI.  p.3.)
Mr. Anderson had the odor of alcohol coming from his person, slurred his words as he spoke,
and had glassy and bloodshot eyes.  (PSI, p.3.)  He was verbally uncooperative and aggressive
during the administered field sobriety tests, and was unable to successfully execute the
examinations.   (PSI,  p.3.)   Mr.  Anderson  was  then  placed  under  arrest  for  suspicion  of  DUI.
(PSI,  p.3.)   In  the  white  truck,  officers  saw  a  can  of  beer  that  had  spilled  out,  as  well  as  an
eighteen-count box of beer with eight cans missing.  (See PSI, p.3.)
After being transported to the Bingham County Jail, Mr. Anderson refused breath testing
but admitted he was drunk.  (PSI, p.3.)  His blood was drawn at the Bingham Memorial Hospital
pursuant to a blood draw warrant.  (PSI, p.3.)
The State charged Mr. Anderson, in a three-part Prosecuting Attorney’s Information, with
one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs and/or any
other intoxicating substance, felony, I.C. §§ 18-8004(1)(a) and 18-8005(9), one count of
unlawful transportation of alcoholic beverages, misdemeanor, I.C. § 23-505, and a persistent
violator sentencing enhancement under I.C. § 19-2514.  (R., pp.107-112.)  Mr. Anderson entered
a not guilty plea to the charges.  (R., pp.126-28.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Anderson agreed to plead guilty to the felony DUI
count, and the State agreed to dismiss the unlawful transportation of alcoholic beverages count
and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  (R., pp.143-51; Tr., Nov. 14, 2016, p.5,
3L.22  –  p.7,  L.25.)   The  State  would  recommend  that  the  sentence  in  this  case  would  run
concurrently with the sentence in Bonneville County No. CR 2014-1944 (hereinafter, the
Bonneville County case).2  (R., p.146; Tr., Nov. 14, 2016, p.8, Ls.1-5.)  The district court
accepted Mr. Anderson’s guilty plea.  (R., pp.154-56; Tr., Nov. 14, 2016, p.12, L.19 – p.13, L.1.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Anderson recommended the district court consider placing
him on probation.  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.14, Ls.16-19.)  Alternatively, Mr. Anderson
recommended  the  district  court  consider  imposing  a  sentence  with  a  shorter  fixed  term  and  a
longer indeterminate term, so he could get access to the treatment about which the parole
commission had talked to him.  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.15, Ls.2-14.)  Mr. Anderson further
recommended the district court run the sentence concurrently with the sentence in the Bonneville
County case.  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.15, Ls.14-15.)  The State recommended the district court
impose a unified sentence of ten years, with seven years fixed.  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.20, Ls.23-
25.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with six years fixed.  (R., pp.161-
64.)  The sentence would run consecutively to the sentence in the Bonneville County case.
(R., p.162.)
Mr. Anderson filed, pro se, a Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35.
(R., pp.170-73.)  Mr. Anderson requested the district court reduce his sentence to “a combined
sentence  of  eight  (8)  years  with  three  (3)  fixed  and  five  (5)  [indeterminate]  with  required
substance abuse treatment and community service,” to run concurrently with the sentence in the
1 All  citations  to  the  PSI  refer  to  the  88-page  PDF  version  of  the  Presentence  Report
and attachments.
2 In Bonneville County No. CR 2014-1944, Mr. Anderson was convicted for felony DUI.  (PSI,
pp.12-13.)  He was sentenced to a unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed.  (PSI, p.12.)
At the time of the present incident, Mr. Anderson had been released from custody and was on
parole supervision.  (See PSI, pp.3, 12-13.)
4Bonneville  County  case.   (See R.,  p.173.)   He  also  filed  a  Motion  for  Hearing  to  present
information and oral argument in support of the Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.174-75.)  Without
conducting a hearing, the district court issued an Order Denying Rule 35 Motion.  (Order
Denying Rule 35 Motion, June 1, 2017.)3
Mr.  Anderson  filed  a  Notice  of  Appeal  timely  from  the  district  court’s  Judgment  of
Conviction/Order of Commitment.  (R., pp.185-87.)
ISSUES
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with six years fixed, upon Mr. Anderson following his plea of guilty to felony DUI?
2. Did  the  district  court  abuse  its  discretion  when  it  failed  to  place  Mr.  Anderson
on probation?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Six Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Anderson Following His Plea Of Guilty To Felony DUI
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his unified
sentence of ten years, with six years fixed, to be served consecutively to the sentence in the
Bonneville County case, because his sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
The district court should have followed Mr. Anderson’s recommendation and imposed a
3 The Order Denying Rule 35 Motion is the subject of a Motion to Augment, filed
contemporaneously with this brief.
5sentence  with  a  shorter  fixed  term  and  a  longer  indeterminate  term,  to  be  served  concurrently
with the sentence in the Bonneville County case.
  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving “due regard
to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Anderson does not assert that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.  Accordingly, in
order  to  show  an  abuse  of  discretion,  Mr.  Anderson  must  show  that  in  light  of  the  governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id.  The governing criteria
or objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing. Id.  An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a
sentence . . . consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726
(2007).  The reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant’s probable term of confinement.” Id.
Mr. Anderson asserts his sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts, because
the district court did not adequately consider mitigating factors.  Specifically, the district court
did not adequately consider Mr. Anderson’s problems with substance abuse.  Mr. Anderson’s
GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary (G-RRS) contained a diagnosis of “Alcohol
Use Disorder, Moderate – In a Controlled Environment.”  (PSI, p.74.)  Mr. Anderson reported
6first using alcohol at the age of nineteen.  (PSI, p.16.)  The presentence report stated that,
“although the defendant appeared to minimize his use and related problems, Mr. Anderson
admitted his substance abuse has contributed to both prior and recent criminal charges.”  (PSI,
p.16.)  Indeed, including the instant offense, Mr. Anderson has eleven DUI convictions, and two
of his five total felony convictions are for DUIs.  (See PSI, pp.4-13; Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.15, L.21
– p.16, L.2.)  Before the instant offense, Mr. Anderson had been sober for fifteen months after he
got out of prison.  (See PSI, p.16; Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.24, Ls.16-17.)  He told the district court he
relapsed after he was kicked out of his residence and was homeless for about two weeks.  (See
Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.24, L.17 – p.25, L.6.)
Mr. Anderson now wants treatment to deal with his substance abuse problems.  The
GRRS stated Mr. Anderson’s “responses indicate high motivation for treatment,” and that he
“reported that he has quit using substances and is about 100% ready to remain abstinent.”  (PSI,
p.79.)  At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel informed the district court Mr. Anderson had
“indicated on numerous occasions that he’s come to the realization that he has to just be done
with this.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.16, Ls.12-14.)  Counsel also stated, “I think that’s he’s correct
in  that  he  just  has  to  be  done,  but  I  think  that  in  order  to  realize  that  goal  and  to  make  that  a
reality he does need to get treatment that can assist him in dealing with the addiction, specifically
with alcohol.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.16, Ls.14-18.)
Additionally, the district court did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Anderson’s
remorse and acceptance of responsibility.  In the Presentence Investigation Questionnaire and
during the sentencing hearing, Mr. Anderson reported he bumped into the tow truck because it
was  sitting  at  a  stop  sign  with  no  taillights.   (See PSI, p.4; Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.23, Ls.6-13.)
However, Mr. Anderson also stated during the presentence investigation that “he was thankful
7for his arrest, despite the events which contributed to that incident. . . .  According to
Mr. Anderson, he learned a valuable lesson; ‘I should have looked for help instead of turning to
alcohol.’”   (PSI,  p.4.)   At  the  sentencing  hearing,  Mr.  Anderson  told  the  district  court,  “I
understand I did wrong.  I understand and I take the responsibility for it.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017,
p.22, Ls.4-5.)  Later in the hearing, he stated, “Your Honor, I understand what those two beers
did to me.  I understand what a danger it did.  I wish that upon no one else.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017,
p.25, Ls.7-9.)
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating factors, the
sentence imposed by the district court is excessive considering any view of the facts.  Thus,
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Anderson’s Sentence Into
Execution Rather Than Place Him On Probation
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ordered his sentence
into execution.  The district court should have followed Mr. Anderson’s recommendation by
placing him on probation.
“A trial court’s decision regarding whether imprisonment or probation is appropriate is
within its discretion.” State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278 (2002).  Before imposing a sentence, a
district court must consider the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521 regarding whether a defendant should
be placed on probation. Id.  “A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of
discretion if it is consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.” Id.
Section 19-2521 provides that a sentencing court
shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing
sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances
8of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the
opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation
the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most
effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the
defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the
community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
I.C. § 19-2521(1).  Additionally, while not controlling the discretion of the court, the
following grounds
shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment:
(a) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm;
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten harm;
(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's
criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated the
commission of the crime;
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal
conduct for the damage or injury that was sustained; provided, however, nothing
in this section shall prevent the appropriate use of imprisonment and restitution in
combination;
(g) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has
led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the
present crime;
9(h) The defendant's  criminal conduct was the result  of circumstances unlikely to
recur; [and]
(i) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that the commission of
another crime is unlikely.
I.C. § 19-2521(2).  However, a district court need not “recite the statutory criteria of I.C. § 19-
2521, or its application of the facts to those criteria in rendering its decision on probation.”
Reber, 138 Idaho at 278.
Mr.  Anderson  asserts  that  the  district  court  did  not  act  consistently  with  the  applicable
legal standards when it ordered his sentence into execution rather than place him on probation,
because it did not adequately consider factors falling within the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521.
Mr. Anderson would be better able to address his substance abuse issues through treatment in the
community while on probation.  The G-RRS recommended Mr. Anderson “engage in Level 2.1
Outpatient Treatment to address his dependence on alcohol, relapse potential and issues
pertaining to his ongoing substance us.”  (PSI, p.84.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Anderson’s counsel informed the district court
Mr.  Anderson  would  be  able  to  get  inpatient  treatment  as  a  tribal  member.   (See Tr.,  Jan.  17,
2017, p.14, L.19 – p.15, L.1.)  Counsel asserted, “treatment is most effective within the
community.  Mr. Anderson would very [much] like to have the opportunity to participate in
community-based treatment.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.14, Ls.14-17.)  Defense counsel told the
district court, “[e]ven with the number of those DUIs that are present, Your Honor, I think that
he is an individual who can succeed with the proper tools.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.17, Ls.4-6.)
Mr. Anderson’s counsel stated, “when people receive treatment in an incarcerated setting, what
they are not receiving is how to incorporate that treatment on a day to day basis.  How to use it
when they are at home or around family or with a bad neighbor or whatever the trigger may be
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that causes them to relapse.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.17, Ls.13-18.)  Counsel further stated,
“[w]hat they are lacking in receiving treatment in an incarcerated setting is treatment that them
how to use those on the ground while running, so to speak.  To teach them how to use it on a day
to day basis and provide them with resources.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.17, Ls.20-24.)
Mr. Anderson informed the district court, “I just would like you to give me the
opportunity to change myself, you know.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.25, Ls.9-10.)  He explained he
felt  “[i]n  prison  you  are  forced  to  change,”  and  “[i]t’s  something  that  you  resent  going  to  the
classes when you are forced to.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.25, Ls.10-15.)  Conversely, “when you’re
out here in the community and it’s like I get to go to my AA meetings, go to this, do that.  You
feel better about it.”  (Tr., Jan 17, 2017, p.25, Ls.16-18.)  Mr. Anderson also stated, “I feel that
I’ve learned more or appreciate it more being able to do it on my own, being able to make myself
go. . . .  Make it to my appointments and get around.  Help myself instead of being forced, you
know.”  (Tr., Jan. 17, 2017, p.25, Ls.18-22.)  For Mr. Anderson, treatment in the community
while on probation would “[h]elp my morale, help me look at myself as a better person because
I’m able  to  get  up  and  do  it  myself  instead  of  being  forced  to  do  it.”   (See Tr., Jan. 17, 2017,
p.25, Ls.23-25.)
That Mr. Anderson would be better able to address his substance abuse issues through
treatment in the community while on probation indicates he is not in need of correctional
treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution.
See I.C. § 19-2521(1)(b).  Coupled with his desire for treatment as explored in Section I above, it
also suggests his character and attitudes indicate that the commission of another crime is
unlikely. See I.C. § 19-2521(2)(i).  Thus, Mr. Anderson asserts the district court did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards when it ordered his sentence into execution
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rather than place him on probation, because it did not adequately consider factors falling within
the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence
Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.  “A motion to alter an otherwise lawful
sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and
essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was
unduly severe.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).  “The
denial of a motion for modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion.” Id.  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested
leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable.” Id.  “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later
show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for
reduction.”  Id.
Mr. Anderson asserts his sentence is excessive in view of the new and additional
information  presented  with  the  Rule  35  motion.   While  some  of  the  assertions  Mr.  Anderson
made in the Rule 35 motion are not cognizable under Rule 35 (see R., pp.171-72 (ineffective
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial bias, and comparative sentencing claims)), Mr. Anderson
also presented new and additional information on his performance while on parole and
opportunities  for  employment  if  released.   Mr.  Anderson  stated  his  parole  officer  “offered  and
intended to address the court at my sentencing, informing the court that I had performed well
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until this incident . . . .”  (See R., p.171.)  Mr. Anderson also asserted, “I would like this Court to
know that employment is available to me, contingent only upon my release, wherein I would be
employed by my tribal [council]  and would,  again,  be of benefit  to my people and society as a
whole.”  (R., p.172.)  Thus, Mr. Anderson’s sentence is excessive in view of the new and
additional information presented with the Rule 35 motion.  The district court abused its
discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 21st day of July, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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